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Binary Signaling under Subjective Priors and Costs as a Game
Serkan Sarıtas¸, Sinan Gezici and Serdar Yu¨ksel
Abstract— Many decentralized and networked control prob-
lems involve decision makers which have either misaligned
criteria or subjective priors. In the context of such a setup,
in this paper we consider binary signaling problems in which
the decision makers (the transmitter and the receiver) have sub-
jective priors and/or misaligned objective functions. Depending
on the commitment nature of the transmitter to his policies,
we formulate the binary signaling problem as a Bayesian
game under either Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium concepts
and establish equilibrium solutions and their properties. In
addition, the effects of subjective priors and costs on Nash
and Stackelberg equilibria are analyzed. It is shown that
there can be informative or non-informative equilibria in the
binary signaling game under the Stackelberg assumption, but
there always exists an equilibrium. However, apart from the
informative and non-informative equilibria cases, under certain
conditions, there does not exist a Nash equilibrium when the
receiver is restricted to use deterministic policies. For the
corresponding team setup, however, an equilibrium typically
always exists and is always informative. Furthermore, we
investigate the effects of small perturbations in priors and costs
on equilibrium values around the team setup (with identical
costs and priors), and show that the Stackelberg equilibrium
behavior is not robust to small perturbations whereas the Nash
equilibrium is.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many decentralized and networked control problems,
decision makers have either misaligned criteria or have
subjective priors, which necessitates solution concepts from
game theory. For example, detecting attacks, anomalies, and
malicious behavior with regard to security in networked
control systems can be analyzed under a game theoretic
perspective, see e.g., [1]–[10].
In this paper, we consider signaling games that refer to
a class of two-player games of incomplete information in
which an informed decision maker (transmitter or encoder)
transmits information to another decision maker (receiver or
decoder) in the hypothesis testing context. In the following,
we first provide the preliminaries and introduce the problems
considered in the paper, and present the related literature
briefly.
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A. Preliminaries
Consider a binary hypothesis-testing problem:
H0 : Y = S0 +N ,
H1 : Y = S1 +N ,
where Y is the observation (measurement) that belongs to
observation set Γ = R, S0 and S1 denote the deterministic
signals under hypothesisH0 and hypothesisH1, respectively,
and N represents a Gaussian noise; i.e., N ∼ N (0, σ2). In
the Bayesian setup, it is assumed that the prior probabilities
of H0 and H1 are available, which are denoted by π0 and
π1, respectively, with π0 + π1 = 1.
In the conventional Bayesian framework, the aim of the
receiver is to design the optimal decision rule (detector)
based on Y in order to minimize the Bayes risk, which is
defined as [11]
r(δ) = π0R0(δ) + π1R1(δ) , (1)
where δ(·) is the decision rule, and Ri(·) is the conditional
risk of the decision rule when hypothesis Hi is true for i ∈
{0, 1}. In general, a decision rule corresponds to a partition
of the observation set Γ into two subsets Γ0 and Γ1, and
the decision becomes Hi if the observation y belongs to Γi,
where i ∈ {0, 1}.
The conditional risks in (1) can be calculated as
Ri(δ) = C0iP0i + C1iP1i , (2)
for i ∈ {0, 1}, where Cji ≥ 0 is the cost of deciding for Hj
when Hi is true, and Pji = P(Y ∈ Γj |Hi) represents the
conditional probability of deciding for Hj given that Hi is
true, where i, j ∈ {0, 1} [11].
It is well-known that the optimal decision rule δ that
minimizes the Bayes risk is the following likelihood ratio
test (LRT):
δ :
{
π1(C01 − C11)p1(y)
H1
R
H0
π0(C10 − C00)p0(y) , (3)
where pi(y) represents the probability density function
(PDF) of Y under Hi, where i ∈ {0, 1} [11].
If the transmitter and the receiver have the same objective
function specified by (1) and (2), then the signals can be
designed to minimize the Bayes risk corresponding to the
decision rule in (3). This leads to a conventional formulation
which has been studied intensely in the literature [11],
[12]. On the other hand, in order to reflect the different
perspectives of the players, the transmitter and the receiver
can have non-aligned Bayes risks. In particular, let Ctji
and Crji represent the cost values from the perspective of
the transmitter and the receiver, respectively, where i, j ∈
{0, 1}. Also let πti and πri for i ∈ {0, 1} denote the priors
from the perspective of the transmitter and the receiver,
respectively, with πj0+π
j
1 = 1, where j ∈ {t, r}. Here, from
transmitter’s and receiver’s perspectives, the priors must be
mutually absolutely continuous with respect to each other;
i.e., πtiπ
r
i = 0⇔ πti = πri = 0 for i ∈ {0, 1}. This condition
assures that the impossibility of any hypothesis holds for both
the transmitter and the receiver simultaneously. The aim of
the transmitter is to perform the optimal design of signals
S = {S0, S1} to minimize his Bayes risk; whereas, the aim
of the receiver is to determine the optimal decision rule δ
over all possible decision rules∆ to minimize his Bayes risk.
The Bayes risks are defined as follows for the transmitter
and the receiver:
rj(S, δ) = πj0R
j
0(S, δ) + π
j
1R
j
1(S, δ) ,
where
Rji (S, δ) = C
j
0iP0i + C
j
1iP1i ,
for i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {t, r}. Here, the transmitter performs
the optimal signal design problem under the power constraint
below:
S , {S : ‖S0‖2 ≤ P0 , ‖S1‖2 ≤ P1} ,
where P0 and P1 denote the power limits.
In the simultaneous-move game, the encoder and the
decoder announce their policies at the same time, and a pair
of policies (S∗, δ∗) is said to be a Nash equilibrium [13] if
rt(S∗, δ∗) ≤ rt(S, δ∗) ∀S ∈ S ,
rr(S∗, δ∗) ≤ rr(S∗, δ) ∀ δ ∈ ∆ . (4)
As noted from the definition in (4), under the Nash equi-
librium, each individual player chooses an optimal strategy
given the strategies chosen by the other players.
However, in the leader-follower game, the leader (encoder)
commits to and announces his optimal policy before the
follower (decoder) does, and the follower observes what the
leader is committed to before choosing and announcing his
optimal policy. Then, a pair of policies (S∗, δ∗) is said to be
a Stackelberg equilibrium [13] if
rt(S∗, δ∗(S∗)) ≤ rt(S, δ∗(S)) ∀S ∈ S ,
where δ∗(S) satisfies
rr(S, δ∗(S)) ≤ rr(S, δ(S)) ∀ δ ∈ ∆ .
(5)
As observed from the definition in (5), the decoder takes
his optimal action δ∗(S) after observing the policy of the
encoder S. Further, in the Stackelberg game, the leader
cannot backtrack on his commitment, and he has a leadership
role since he can manipulate the follower by anticipating
follower’s actions.
In game theory, Nash (simultaneous game-play) and Stack-
elberg (sequential game-play) equilibria are drastically dif-
ferent concepts. Both equilibrium concepts find applications
depending on the assumptions on the transmitter in view
of the commitment conditions. As discussed in [14], [15],
in the Nash equilibrium case, building on [16], equilibrium
properties possess different characteristics as compared to
team problems; whereas for the Stackelberg case, the leader
agent is restricted to be committed to his announced policy
which leads to similarities with team problem setups [17]–
[19]. Since there is no such commitment in the Nash setup;
the perturbation in the encoder does not lead to a functional
perturbation in decoder’s policy, unlike the Stackelberg setup.
However, in the context of binary signaling, we will see that
the distinction is not as sharp as it is in the case of quadratic
signaling games [14], [15].
If an equilibrium is achieved when S∗ is non-informative
(e.g., S0 = S1) and δ
∗ uses only the priors (since the received
message is useless), then we call such an equilibrium a non-
informative (babbling) equilibrium.
B. Related Literature
Standard binary hypothesis testing has been extensively
studied over several decades under different setups [11], [12],
which can also be viewed as a decentralized control/team
problem among an encoder and a decoder who wish to
minimize a common cost criterion. However, there exist
many scenarios in which the analysis falls within the scope of
game theory; either because the goals of the decision makers
are misaligned, or because the probabilistic model of the
system is not common knowledge among the decision mak-
ers. For example, detecting attacks, anomalies, and malicious
behavior in network security can be analyzed under the game
theoretic perspective [1]–[5]. In this direction, the hypothesis
testing and the game theory approaches can be utilized
together to investigate attacker-defender type applications
[6]–[10], multimedia source identification problems [20], and
inspection games [21]–[23].
In particular, the binary signaling problem investigated
here can be motivated under different application contexts:
subjective priors and the presence of a bias in the transmitter
cost function when compared with that of the receiver. The
former one, decentralized stochastic control with subjective
priors, has been studied extensively in the literature [24]–
[26]. In this setup, players have a common goal but subjective
prior information, which necessarily alters the setup from
a team problem to a game problem. The latter one is the
adaptation of the biased cost function of the transmitter in
[16] to the binary signaling problem considered here. We
discuss these further in the following.
C. Two Motivating Setups
We present two different scenarios that fit into the binary
signaling context discussed here and revisit these setups
throughout the paper.
1) Subjective Priors: Suppose that only the beliefs of the
transmitter and the receiver about the prior probabilities of
hypothesis H0 and H1 differ, and the cost values from the
perspective of the transmitter and the receiver are the same.
Namely, from transmitter’s perspective, the priors are πt0
and πt1, whereas the priors are π
r
0 and π
r
1 from receiver’s
perspective, and Cji = C
t
ji = C
r
ji for i, j ∈ {0, 1}.
The setups in decentralized decision making where the
priors of the decision makers may be different is an intensely
researched area: Among these, [25] and [26] study decen-
tralized decision making with subjective priors, and [24]
investigates optimal decentralized decision making where the
nature of subjective priors converts a team problem into a
game problem (see [27, Section 12.2.3] for a comprehensive
literature review on subjective priors also from a statistical
decision making perspective).
2) Biased Transmitter Cost Function: Consider a binary
signaling game in which the transmitter encodes a random
binary signal x = i as Hi by choosing the corresponding
signal level Si for i ∈ {0, 1}, and the receiver decodes
the received signal y as u = δ(y). Let the priors from
the perspectives of the transmitter and the receiver be the
same; i.e., πi = π
t
i = π
r
i for i ∈ {0, 1}, and the Bayes
risks of the transmitter and the receiver be defined as
rt(S, δ) = E[1{1=(x⊕u⊕b)}] and rr(S, δ) = E[1{1=(x⊕u)}],
respectively, where 1{D} denotes the indicator function of
an event D, ⊕ stands for the exclusive-or operator and b is
the random binary bias term, so that the structure of the costs
(Bayes risks) resemble the ones in [16] (as also studied in
[14], [15]). Also let α , Pr(b = 0) = 1 − Pr(b = 1);
i.e., the probability that the cost functions of the transmitter
and the receiver are aligned. The following relations can be
observed:
rt(S, δ) = E[1{1=(x⊕u⊕b)}]
= α(π0P10 + π1P01) + (1− α)(π0P00 + π1P11)
⇒ Ct01 = Ct10 = α and Ct00 = Ct11 = 1− α ,
rr(S, δ) = E[1{1=(x⊕u)}] = π0P10 + π1P01
⇒ Cr01 = Cr10 = 1 and Cr00 = Cr11 = 0 .
D. Contributions
The main contributions of this study can be summarized
as follows:
1) A game theoretic formulation of the binary signaling
problem is proposed under subjective priors and/or
subjective costs.
2) Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium policies are obtained
and their properties (such as uniqueness and informa-
tiveness) are investigated.
a) It is proved that an equilibrium is almost always
informative for a team setup (practically, 0 < τ <
1), whereas in the case of subjective priors and/or
costs, it may cease to be informative.
b) It is shown that Stackelberg equilibria always
exist, whereas there are setups under which Nash
equilibria may not exist.
3) Robustness of equilibrium solutions to small perturba-
tions in the priors or costs are established. It is shown
that, the game equilibrium behavior around the team
setup is robust under the Nash assumption, whereas it
is not robust under the Stackelberg assumption.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
team setup, the Stackelberg setup, and the Nash setup of the
binary signaling game are investigated in Sections II, Section
III, and Section IV, respectively. Section V concludes the
paper.
II. TEAM SETUP ANALYSIS
Now consider the team setup where the cost parameters
and the priors are assumed to be same for both the transmitter
and the receiver; i.e., Cji = C
t
ji = C
r
ji and πi = π
t
i = π
r
i
for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Thus the common Bayes risk becomes
rt(S, δ) = rr(S, δ) = π0(C00P00+C10P10)+π1(C01P01+
C11P11). The arguments for the proof of the following
result follow from the standard analysis in the detection and
estimation literature [11], [12].
Theorem 2.1: Let τ , π0(C10−C00)
π1(C01−C11) . If τ ≤ 0 or τ =∞,
then the team solution of the binary signaling setup is non-
informative. Otherwise; i.e., if 0 < τ <∞, the team solution
is always informative.
III. STACKELBERG GAME ANALYSIS
Under the Stackelberg assumption, first the transmitter (the
leader agent) announces and commits to a particular policy,
and then the receiver (the follower agent) acts accordingly.
In this direction, first the transmitter chooses optimal signals
S = {S0, S1} to minimize his Bayes risk rt(S, δ), then
the receiver chooses an optimal decision rule δ accordingly
to minimize his Bayes risk rr(S, δ). Due to the sequential
structure of the Stackelberg game, the encoder knows the
priors and the cost parameters of the decoder so that he
can adjust his optimal policy accordingly. On the other
hand, the decoder knows only the policy of the encoder as
he announces during the game-play. Under such a game-
play assumption, the equilibrium structure of the Stackelberg
binary signaling game can be characterized as follows:
Theorem 3.1: If τ , π
r
0
(Cr
10
−Cr
00
)
πr
1
(Cr
01
−Cr
11
) ≤ 0 or τ = ∞, the
Stackelberg equilibrium of the binary signaling game is non-
informative. Otherwise, let d , |S1−S0|
δ
, dmax ,
√
P0+
√
P1
σ
,
ζ , sgn(Cr01 − Cr11), k0 , πt0ζ(Ct10 − Ct00)τ−
1
2 , and k1 ,
πt1ζ(C
t
01 − Ct11)τ
1
2 , where the sign of x is defined as
sgn(x) =


−1 if x < 0
0 if x = 0
1 if x > 0
.
Then, the Stackelberg equilibrium structure can be character-
ized as in Table I, where d∗ = 0 stands for a non-informative
equilibrium, and a nonzero d∗ corresponds to an informative
equilibrium.
Now we make the following remark on informativeness of
the Stackelberg equilibrium:
Remark 3.1: As we observed in Theorem 2.1, for a
team setup, an equilibrium is almost always informative
(practically, 0 < τ < ∞), whereas in the case of subjective
priors and/or costs, it may cease to be informative.
The most interesting case is when ln τ (k0 − k1) <
0, k0 + k1 < 0, and d
2
max ≥
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1)
∣∣∣, since in all
other cases, the transmitter chooses either the minimum or
maximum distance between the signal levels. Further, for
TABLE I: Stackelberg equilibrium analysis for 0 < τ <∞.
ln τ (k0 − k1) < 0 ln τ (k0 − k1) ≥ 0
k0 + k1 < 0 d∗ = min
{
dmax,
√∣∣∣ 2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1)
∣∣∣} d∗ = 0, non-informative
k0 + k1 ≥ 0 d∗ = dmax
d2max <
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0 − k1)
(k0 + k1)
∣∣∣⇒ d∗ = 0, non-informative
d2max ≥
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0 − k1)
(k0 + k1)
∣∣∣⇒
(
k1
k0τ
)sgn(ln(τ))
Q
(
| ln(τ)|
dmax
−
dmax
2
)
−Q
(
| ln(τ)|
dmax
+
dmax
2
)
d
∗=dmax
R
d∗=0
0
classical hypothesis-testing in the team setup, the optimal
distance corresponds to maximum separation [11]. However,
as it can be seen in Figure 1, there is an optimal distance
d∗ =
√∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1)
∣∣∣ < dmax that makes the Bayes risk of
the transmitter minimum.
Fig. 1: The Bayes risk of the transmitter versus d when Cr01 = 0.4, C
r
10 =
0.9, Cr00 = 0, C
r
11 = 0, C
t
01 = 0.4, C
t
10 = 0.4, C
t
00 = 0.6, C
t
11 =
0.6, P0 = 1, P1 = 1, σ = 0.1, pit0 = 0.25, and pi
r
0 = 0.25. The optimal
d∗ =
√∣∣∣ 2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1)
∣∣∣ = 0.4704 < dmax and its corresponding Bayes
risk are indicated by the star.
We now investigate the effects of small perturbations in
priors and costs on equilibrium values. In particular, we
consider the perturbations around the team setup; i.e., at the
point of identical priors and costs.
Define the perturbation around the team setup as ǫ =
{ǫπ0, ǫπ1, ǫ00, ǫ01, ǫ10, ǫ11} ∈ R6 such that πti = πri + ǫπi
and Ctji = C
r
ji + ǫji for i, j ∈ {0, 1} (note that the
transmitter parameters are perturbed around the receiver
parameters which are assumed to be fixed). Then, for
0 < τ < ∞, at the point of identical priors and costs,
small perturbations in both priors and costs imply k0 =
(πr0 + ǫπ0)ζ(C
r
10 − Cr00 + ǫ10 − ǫ00)τ−
1
2 and k1 = (π
r
1 +
ǫπ1)ζ(C
r
01 − Cr11 + ǫ01 − ǫ11)τ
1
2 . Since, for 0 < τ < ∞,
k0 = k1 =
√
πr0π
r
1
√
(Cr10 − Cr00)(Cr01 − Cr11) > 0 at the
point of identical priors and costs, it is possible to obtain both
positive and negative (k0 − k1) by choosing the appropriate
perturbation ǫ around the team setup. Then, as it can be
observed from Table I, even the equilibrium may alter from
an informative one to a non-informative one; hence, under
the Stackelberg equilibrium, the equilibrium behavior is not
robust to small perturbations in both priors and costs.
A. Motivating Examples
1) Subjective Priors : Referring to Section I-C.1, the
related parameters can be found as follows:
τ =
πr0(C10 − C00)
πr1(C01 − C11)
,
k0 = π
t
0
√
πr1
πr0
√
(C10 − C00)(C01 − C11) ,
k1 = π
t
1
√
πr0
πr1
√
(C10 − C00)(C01 − C11) .
If 0 < τ <∞, then k0+k1 > 0, and depending on the
values of ln τ (k0 − k1), d2max, and
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0−k1)(k0+k1)
∣∣∣, the
Stackelberg equilibrium structure can be characterized
as in Table II. Otherwise; i.e., if τ ≤ 0 or τ =∞, the
equilibrium is non-informative.
2) Biased Transmitter Cost Function : Based on the
arguments in Section I-C.2, the related parameters can
be found as follows:
τ =
π0
π1
, k0 =
√
π0π1(2α− 1) , k1 = √π0π1(2α− 1) .
Thus, ln τ (k0−k1) = 0 and k0+k1 = 2√π0π1(2α−
1). Then, if α < 1/2, the transmitter chooses S0 = S1
to minimize d, and the equilibrium is non-informative;
i.e., he does not send any meaningful information to the
transmitter and the receiver considers only the priors.
If α = 1/2, the transmitter has no control on his
Bayes risk, hence the equilibrium is non-informative.
Otherwise; i.e., if α > 1/2, the equilibrium is always
informative. In other words, if α > 1/2, the players
act like a team.
IV. NASH GAME ANALYSIS
Under the Nash assumption, the transmitter chooses op-
timal signals S = {S0, S1} to minimize rt(S, δ), and the
receiver chooses optimal decision rule δ to minimize rr(S, δ)
simultaneously. In this Nash setup, the encoder and the
decoder do not know the priors and the cost parameters of
each other; they know only their policies as they announce
to each other. Further, there is no commitment between
the transmitter and the receiver; hence, the perturbation in
the encoder does not lead to a functional perturbation in
decoder’s policy, unlike the Stackelberg setup. Due to this
drastic difference, the equilibrium structure and convergence
properties of the Nash equilibrium show significant differ-
ences from the ones in the Stackelberg equilibrium, as stated
in the following theorem:
TABLE II: Stackelberg equilibrium analysis of subjective priors case for 0 < τ <∞.
0 < τ < 1 1 ≤ τ <∞
pi
t
0
pi
t
1
<
pi
r
0
pi
r
1
d2max <
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0 − k1)
(k0 + k1)
∣∣∣⇒ Case-5 applies, d∗ = 0, non-informative
d2max ≥
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0 − k1)
(k0 + k1)
∣∣∣⇒ Case-6 applies
Case-1 applies, d∗ = dmax
pi
t
0
pi
t
1
≥
pi
r
0
pi
r
1
Case-1 applies, d∗ = dmax
d2max <
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0 − k1)
(k0 + k1)
∣∣∣⇒ Case-5 applies, d∗ = 0, non-informative
d2max ≥
∣∣∣2 ln τ(k0 − k1)
(k0 + k1)
∣∣∣⇒ Case-6 applies
Theorem 4.1: Let τ , π
r
0
(Cr
10
−Cr
00
)
πr
1
(Cr
01
−Cr
11
) and ζ , sgn(C
r
01 −
Cr11), ξ0 ,
Ct
10
−Ct
00
Cr
10
−Cr
00
, and ξ1 ,
Ct
01
−Ct
11
Cr
01
−Cr
11
. If τ ≤ 0 or τ =∞,
then the Nash equilibrium of the binary signaling game is
non-informative. Otherwise; i.e., if 0 < τ < ∞, the Nash
equilibrium structure is as depicted in Table III.
The main reason for the absence of a non-informative
(babbling) equilibrium under the Nash assumption is that
in the binary signaling game setup, the receiver is forced
to make a decision. Using only the prior information, the
receiver always chooses one of the hypothesis. By knowing
this, the encoder can manipulate his signaling strategy for his
own benefit. However, after this manipulation, the receiver
no longer keeps his decision rule the same; namely, the best
response of the receiver alters based on the signaling strategy
of the transmitter, which entails another change of the best
response of the transmitter. Due to such an infinite recursion,
there does not exist a pure Nash equilibrium.
Similar to the Stackelberg case, the effects of small pertur-
bations in priors and costs on equilibrium values around the
team setup are investigated for the Nash setup as follows:
Define the perturbation around the team setup as ǫ =
{ǫπ0, ǫπ1, ǫ00, ǫ01, ǫ10, ǫ11} ∈ R6 such that πti = πri +ǫπi and
Ctji = C
r
ji + ǫji for i, j ∈ {0, 1} (note that the transmitter
parameters are perturbed around the receiver parameters
which are assumed to be fixed). Then, for 0 < τ < ∞,
at the point of identical priors and costs, small perturbations
in priors and costs imply ξ0 =
Cr
10
−Cr
00
+ǫ10−ǫ00
Cr
10
−Cr
00
and ξ1 =
Cr
01
−Cr
11
+ǫ01−ǫ11
Cr
01
−Cr
11
. As it can be seen, the Nash equilibrium is
not affected by small perturbations in priors. Further, since
ξ0 = ξ1 = 1 at the point of identical priors and costs for
0 < τ <∞, as long as the perturbation ǫ is chosen such that
| ǫ10−ǫ00
Cr
10
−Cr
00
| < 1 and | ǫ01−ǫ11
Cr
01
−Cr
11
| < 1, we always obtain positive
ξ0 and ξ1 in Table III. Thus, under the Nash assumption, the
equilibrium behavior is robust to small perturbations in both
priors and costs.
A. Motivating Examples
1) Subjective Priors : The related parameters are τ =
πr
0
(C10−C00)
πr
1
(C01−C11) , ξ0 = 1, and ξ1 = 1. Thus, if τ < 0 or
τ =∞, the equilibrium is non-informative; otherwise,
there always exists a unique informative equilibrium;
namely, as long as the priors are mutually absolutely
continuous, the subjectivity in the priors does not affect
the equilibrium.
2) Biased Transmitter Cost Function : If α > 1/2, the
equilibrium is informative; if α = 1/2, the equilibrium
is non-informative; otherwise; i.e., if α < 1/2, there
exists no equilibrium. As it can be seen, the existence
of the equilibrium depends on α = Pr(b = 0), the
probability that the Bayes risks of the transmitter and
the receiver are aligned.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered binary signaling problems in
which the decision makers (the transmitter and the receiver)
have subjective priors and/or misaligned objective functions.
Depending on the commitment nature of the transmitter to
his policies, we formulated the binary signaling problem as
a Bayesian game under either Nash or Stackelberg equi-
librium concepts and established equilibrium solutions and
their properties. We showed that there can be informative
or non-informative equilibria in the binary signaling game
under the Stackelberg assumption, but there always exists an
equilibrium. However, apart from the informative and non-
informative equilibria cases, there may not be a Nash equi-
librium when the receiver is restricted to use deterministic
policies. We also studied the effects of small perturbations
at the point of identical priors and costs and showed that the
game equilibrium behavior around the team setup is robust
under the Nash assumption, whereas it is not robust under
the Stackelberg assumption.
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